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Elijah Millgram on defeasible reasoning, 26th Feb. 2019, 14:15

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Elijah Millgram on defeasible reasoning, 26th Feb. 2019, 14:15
by Wilfried Keller - Friday, 15 February 2019, 2:31 PM
As you might know, Elijah Millgram is visiting the UdS soon, leading up to his lecture on Nietzsche (27th Feb). This  fortunately will not be the only occasion on which you will be able to discuss philosophy with him, in particular there will be another small workshop, where he will present his new take on defeasible reasoning:

Elijah Millgram: TBA
Tuesday, 26th of February, 14:15
Building A2 3, room 0.09

He will read an abbreviated version of his unpublished paper "TBA" in order to discuss its central points. There is no required background reading (particularly, because it will happen during the semester break) and everybody interested is invited to join the discussion!

Here is an abstract:


Almost all of our reasoning is *defeasible*: that is, our inferences go through only other things equal, and there are always more of those things to be equal -- the list of things that might go wrong is open-ended, and doesn't run out. Most work on defeasibility (or on-monotonic reasoning, if you're in the AI world) is focused on how to *represent* it, but I want to take a step back, and ask why it's *there*. I will argue that defeasible inference is a hard-to-avoid design feature of certain kinds of boundedly rational agents, that the open-endedness is genuine, and that we need to understand defeasibility from an engineering -- rather than a formal -- perspective.